ABSTRACT Lithium-ion battery fires and explosions in various battery-operated products have raised safety concerns. While external abuse of batteries can cause fires and explosions, most of the reported problems arose from internal battery defects, which are often difficult to detect. One particular and significant defect pertains to burrs on the tab used to connect the anode and cathode layers to the external terminals of the battery. This paper investigates burr-related issues, presents a case wherein a burr most likely caused thermal runaway in a battery and overviews the standard associated with burr control and the application of computed tomography scanning to assess the risks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Li-ion batteries have become a preferred energy storage device compared to lead-acid batteries due to their higher specific capacity, energy density, and power density. These advantages have allowed the proliferation of Li-ion battery technology in a wide variety of applications including portable electronic consumer products, electric vehicles, and grid storage. However, Li-ion batteries pose safety risks due to the presence of the flammable electrolyte and oxidizing agents [1] .
Thermal runaway is a process which is accelerated by increased temperature, and in turn releases energy that further increases battery temperature in an uncontrollable manner. In the Li-ion battery, it is associated with exothermic reactions that are accelerated by temperature rise. When a Li-ion battery is subjected to abusive conditions such as overheating, overvoltage or short-circuit, thermal runaway conditions can arise. However, even under normal operating conditions, Li-ion batteries can undergo thermal runaway if there are manufacturing defects present inside the battery. Manufacturing defects include defects in battery materials, presence of foreign material particles, non-uniform
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A cylindrical Li-ion battery consists of a ''jellyroll'' composed of layers of positive (cathode) and negative (anode) electrodes insulated from each other by a separator layer, soaked in a liquid electrolyte and placed in a tubular metal case as shown in Figure 1 . The metal case is usually provided with a vent to allow the controlled release of gases in the case of thermal runaway. The safety devices are located on the cap of the cylindrical Li-ion batteries to prevent thermal runaway, which include positive temperature coefficient (PTC) thermistors, current interruption device (CID), and vents. The PTC is provided to protect against short-circuit as its resistance increases with the temperature increment to decrease the battery current. The CID opens when the pressure inside the battery increases beyond a threshold resulting in the disconnection of positive terminal with the rest of the cell assembly. While, PTC is reusable when the battery temperature recovers to normal condition, CID and vents are permanently disabled once they are triggered.
In Li-ion batteries, electrode materials are coated onto the metallic current collectors. The positive current collector is usually made of aluminum, and the negative current collector is usually made of copper. These current collectors are welded on metallic tabs which connect to the external terminals of the battery. The positive tab is usually made of aluminum, and the negative tab is usually made of nickel.
The most popular welding methods for the current collector are ultrasonic welding and laser welding. Ultrasonic metal welding uses high-frequency ultrasonic vibration, typically 20 kHz or above, to join substrate materials by creating solid-state bonds under a clamping pressure [4] . As ultrasonic welding exerts high-frequency vibration under a locally applied normal force, there is a risk that it may result in burrs [5] .
Laser welding uses a focused laser beam as a point source of energy to create localized heating to join parts together [5] , [6] . Laser welding is emerging as an efficient alternative for forming joints between tabs and current collectors. However, there is also a risk of burrs, which can form when the energy concentration is not evenly distributed [5] .
Welding burrs can penetrate the neighboring electrode and separator layers and cause internal short circuits, leading to thermal runaway, fires and explosion. In fact, even small burrs can cause tearing or puncturing of a separator, because during battery charge-discharge operation, thermal expansion due to joule heating and lithium intercalation, as well as swelling due to gas generation, can cause movement and wear between layers [7] . In fact, one of the reported causes of the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 fires was penetration of the insulating tape (on the tabs) and separator by welding burrs on the positive electrode [8].
II. BURR SCREENING AND PREVENTION
The IEEE 1625 standard notes that a burr is a sharp metallic projection that emanates from an electrode foil and can thus penetrate the separator and cause an internal short in a Li-ion or Li-ion polymer cell (see Figure 2 ) [9] . This standard applies to all types of rechargeable lithium-ion and lithiumion polymer batteries and battery packs for use in mobile computing devices, such as notebook computers. Since cylindrical Li-ion batteries have been used in the mobile computing devices, the design and manufacturing related guidance in this standard will be applicable. The IEEE 1625 standard, Section 5.3.6.2 [9] provides some guidance on the measurement of burrs, and states that at least once per shift or once per manufacturing lot, burrs should be measured at each cutting point to determine whether or not burr heights are less than 50% of the lower tolerance limit of the separator thickness. While the standard suggests a size requirement, burrs smaller than those listed in the standard, can induce tears or punctures in all the cell layers over time due to wear and expansion and contraction of the layers in the battery. The standard also needs to cover all methods of burr generation such as the welding process of tabs on the current collectors.
In order to assess manufacturing defects such as tab burrs in an assembled cell, X-ray computed tomography (CT) scan is an excellent nondestructive tool [10] and uniquely suited for dimensional measurement of components having internal geometry, difficult-to-reach part features, and easy-todeform or flexible structures [11] . The CT system consists of an X-ray source tube and X-ray detector. The specimen is mounted on a rotatory table that rotates 360 • to allow the detector to record 2D X-ray images at different angular positions. The 3D object is then reconstructed from these 2D images in the software. The 3D image represents a volumetric gray-scale value map corresponding to X-ray attenuation by different points on the specimen. The gray-scale values depend on the density and composition of the material of the specimen and also on the energy of the X-ray photons passing through [11] . Materials having higher density will produce a brighter (less dark) image with all other parameters being constant. The interested reader should refer to references [10] , [11] for more detailed information on the working principles of CT scan technology.
This remainder of this paper presents a case study of two cylindrical batteries to show the concerns with burrs, how CT scans can be effectively used to observe burrs due to welding and how one can use it to assess the burr height for evaluating the risk of internal short circuits.
III. CASE STUDY
This section presents a case study of the analysis of two rechargeable cylindrical 18650 cells with 3000 mAh nominal capacity (Figure 3) . Sample A1 was a relatively new battery. Sample A2 exploded in a user's pants pocket. At the time of explosion of A2, only the battery was in the user's pocket. There were no objects including any metal objects in the pants pocket, and there were no other opportunities for external causes. It is thus something internal to the battery that initiated the thermal runaway process.
A Nikon 225kV CT scanner with a 225kV micro focus tube was utilized to inspect these samples. The CT data was processed using the Nikon Metrology CT Pro 3D software. The scan settings were 185kV and 111uA at a duration of 45 minutes per scan. All shown images have a resolution of 38 µm/voxel and were contrast enhanced using Volume Graphics VGStudio MAX 3.0. Figure 4 shows cross-section of sample A1 along the X-Y plane (blue color in Figure 4b ) and a 3D image from the CT scan of sample A1. Figure 4a shows that there is a burr present on the outer negative tab of this battery. Similar burrs have been observed in the X-Y cross-sectional views at different heights of this battery. However, at the plane location shown in Figure 4b , the burr height on the outer negative tab was observed to be significant enough to pose a critical risk not only of tearing but also of separator puncture.
The CT scan provides an estimate of the thickness of one sandwich layer consisting of the cathode current collector, cathode active material, separator, anode active material, and anode current collector. Note, a separator layer is on the order of 10 microns (0.01 mm). Measurements of the total thickness of one of the jellyroll sandwich layers were conducted at 4 different locations (a), (b), (c), and (d) shown in Figure 5 . The average thickness of one jellyroll sandwich was found to be 130 microns ± 30 microns (0.13 ± 0.03 mm).
The burr height, measured as the height of the burr protrusion beyond the original boundary of the tab, was roughly 150 microns (0.15 mm and 15 times larger than the separator: see Figure 5 ). The thickness of the burr was greater than the average thickness of one jellyroll sandwich (130 microns). This burr is therefore capable of penetrating the entire thickness of the neighboring separator and can lead to internal short circuit. This battery does not meet IEEE 1625 standard, Section 5.3.6.2, which prescribes that the burr penetration should not exceed the 50% of the lower tolerance limit of the separator thickness.
The burr was also analyzed in battery as shown in Figures 6 and 7 . Figure 6 shows the zoomed-in version of different layers of jellyroll in the CT scan (zoomed-in version taken from [10] ). The thickness of these sandwich layers were also measured at four different random locations of (A), (B), (C), and (D) in Figure 7 . The average thickness was 130 microns ± 30 microns. These measurements are consistent with those in Figure 5 . The burr height in this crosssectional view was roughly 130 microns, which is equal to the thickness of the one whole layer sandwich and suggests that the burr can easily puncture through the entire thickness of the separator. Hence this battery does not meet the IEEE 1625 standard, Section 5.3.6.2. Figure 8 shows cross-section of battery A2 along the X-Y plane and a 3D image from the CT scan. The casing and the electrode layers were severely deformed because the battery was stepped on to put out the fire. The CT scan in Figure 8a show welding burrs on the negative tab of battery A2. The burr height was found to be 100 microns (0.10 mm). This burr height is more than 75% of the thickness of a full set of layers in the jellyroll, and 10 times the thickness of the separator. As a result, the burr can easily puncture the entire thickness of separator. Since no other defects were observed, this also provides overwhelming evidence that the tab burrs were the cause of explosion of A2.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Manufacturing defects such as burrs on the tab exacerbate the safety risks associated with Li-ion batteries and should be prevented through proper manufacturing process control and product screening. IEEE standard 1625, Section 5.3.6.2, provides guidance on the safe height limit of the burrs that form on current collectors due to the cutting process. The scope of the standard should be expanded to include burrs that can also be generated as part of the attachment process of tabs on the current collectors. Additionally, the burr height described in the standard is not conservative enough, since tearing over time can occur due to the swelling and thermal deformations within the battery, especially those in a cylindrical cell.
This paper used CT scan to measure the burr height and evaluate the risk of internal short circuit due to these tab burrs. The case study used one exploded and one intact cylindrical 18650 battery. The CT scan was able to effectively determine the burr dimensions and determine the risks for the burr to puncture the separator. The current standard should be expanded to include CT scanning for burr measurement as one of the quality control methods following battery assembly.
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